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Cyborg Environmentalism and the Privileged Leftist (48 pp.)
Chair; Bill Chaloupka 1 ? ' ^ '
Acting Chair: Tom Roy
The contemporary environmental movement, while generally aligned with leftist 
politics, relies on tropes that often reinforce a white, middle to upper class, heterosexual, 
male hegemony. Although many types of people are complicit in this pattern, we can 
focus critique by concentrating on one particular character: the white, middle to upper 
class, heterosexual, male, left-leaning environmentalist. This character serves as a limit 
case for privilege. What can be done to rewrite his tropic practices can be done for all 
privileged left-environmentalists.
Donna Haraway, Noel Sturgeon, and Peter van Wyck see potential in tropes based on 
the cyborg, a partially organic, partially technological actor. The cyborg, they argue, 
presents new political space for feminism, leftism, and environmentalism and acts as a 
prophylactic to the réinscription of hegemony. Each author shies away from explicitly 
discussing the white, middle to upper class, heterosexual, male, left-leaning 
environmentalist, but I find that the cyborg trope is useful here, also. Overall, the cyborg 
offers a vision of left-environmentalism that moves beyond images of guilt and innocence 
and into a tricky landscape of accountability, danger, and commitment.
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Introduction
My project is narrow and partial; To open new, anti-hegemonic, political space 
within environmentalism. My strategy is to concentrate on the white, middle to upper 
class, heterosexual, male environmentalist who desires to live counter to his violent social 
heritage and to relinquish the durable and adaptive privilege that sustains that heritage. 
W hat can be done for him  can be done for environmentalism in general. The project is 
tricky: Hegemonic privilege has a certain capacity to endure, even in the most liberal 
sectors o f environmentalism, and opening new political space might only succeed in 
extending the reaches o f  privilege. I enlist, therefore, the help o f the cyborg (a very 
tricky character).
Cyborgs are partially biological, partially technological actors. Some obvious 
examples o f cyborgs include the optically-improved LaForge in Star Trek: The Next 
Generation and the behooked Captain Hook o f Peter Pan. The particular cyborg I wish 
to discuss is figured in the work o f theorist and historian of science Donna Haraway.
This cyborg appeared when Haraway was asked to consider the future o f socialist
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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feminism under the Thatcher and Reagan administrations, when many feminists were 
using essentialism (sometimes in the form o f revived traditions o f  goddess worship) as a 
means of empowering women.' Though never completely rejecting essentialism or 
goddess worship, Haraway finds trouble in them and offers the cyborg as an alternative 
socialist feminist role model. Cyborgs are o f illegitimate origin and uncertain kinship; 
thus, Haraway argues, they have a politics that does not rely on salvation or stable 
identity. Cyborgs may be equipped, then, to open up possibilities within the very 
technoculture that incorporates women, rather than looking beyond that incorporation for 
a mythical past or a natural(izing) self to return to.
Beyond the aphorism, “I ’d rather be a cyborg than a goddess,” however, Haraway 
uses the cyborg to disrupt the very dualisms that might make us take essentialism and 
anti-essentialism so seriously in the first place. Haraway wants to treat dualisms like 
identity/difference, mind/body, culture/nature, technological/organic, truth/illusion, 
man/woman, and even cyborg/goddess as both unresolvable and  illusory. The divide 
between the sides o f  these dualisms cannot easily be erased, but it can be transgressed, 
confused, or obscured. Our best bet, Haraway seems to think, is to treat dualisms 
ironically, to recognize or blur them as necessary. “One is too few, but two are too 
m any,” she says neatly. Haraway’s cyborg has no commitment to one side o f a dualism 
or another; it straddles the boundaries and is both organic and technological, natural and 
artifactual. It is one, both, and neither side o f a dualism— depending when you look at it 
and what you want when you do.
' Essentialism asserts that a certain thing or class o f  things has a non-accidental, inherent property. In the 
case o f  essentialist feminism, women are posited as naturally more intuitive and naturally less exploitative
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3
The cyborg trope proliferates from there in Haraway’s writings to offer a multitude of 
possibilities for oppositional lives for oppressed groups living in a new, digital world 
order. Whether the cyborg trope could be useful to white, middle to upper class, 
heterosexual, male left-environmentalists, however, is left unanswered by Haraway. She 
goes only as far as to tell us that her cyborg is definitely female and “hasn't really figured 
out a politics that makes the necessary articulations with the boys who are your allies.
I t’s undone work” (Int 20).^
Two other theorists, Noel Sturgeon and Peter van Wyck, continue the project by 
examining possibilities for cyborg environmentalism. Sturgeon uses Haraway’s cyborg 
to reframe a perennial debate in feminist environmentalist circles over the dangers and 
advantages o f essentialism. While Sturgeon’s work does suggest ways the cyborg trope 
might help female left-environmentalists, it leaves out the question of male participation. 
Van Wyck uses the cyborg in a left critique of deep ecology and proposes a cyborgian 
way to care about nature without denying that nature is produced discursively and 
without relying on an authorizing narrative. Unfortunately, van Wyck, as we shall see, 
replicates the very hegemony Haraway resists by implicitly casting the white, middle to 
upper class man in the role o f his cyborg environmentalist.
Haraway, Sturgeon, and van Wyck each leave me wondering what it would mean to 
be a leftist, white, male, cyborg environmentalist. It is in the space left open (and thus 
full o f possibility) by the overlapping partialities o f their theories that my ultimate
than men.
■ Because I quote more than one work by Haraway, I will use the following abbreviation system for in-text 
citations (full citations appear at the end o f  the paper): CM, “ A Cyborg “ Manifesto” ; SK, “ Situated 
K now ledges” ; PM, “The Promise o f  Monsters” ; MW, Modest Witness@Second Milleniiim.com; Int,
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interest lies. There, somewhere in the sticky field o f anti-racist, anti-sexist, anti-classist, 
anti-imperialist, anti-heterocentrist, socialist environmentalism, I want to stage a meeting 
between the cyborg and the white, middle to upper class, heterosexual male. What comes 
o f it should say something about possibilities for our future.
M ethodology
The problem o f privilege occupies this paper both as subject matter and
methodological constraint. Simply put, there is a fear that my own privilege might
reinscribe itself in this work, even though my project tries to call into question such
tendencies. I find this interesting as well as crucial to discuss, so I will take a moment to
acknowledge some o f the problems inherent in my project and some of the ways I find
these problems productive.
In part, this paper will depend on a description o f ways mainstream environmentalism
is oppressive to groups to which I do not belong, bell hooks warns us that such
scholarship, too often, is taken as more authoritative and legitimate than scholarly work
done on the same subject by members o f the oppressed groups in question.
Even if  perceived "authorities" writing about the group to which they do not belong and/or 
over which they wield power, are progressive, caring, and right-on in every way, as long as 
their authority is constituted by either the absence o f  the voices o f  the individuals whose 
experiences they seek to address, or the dismissal o f  those voices as unimportant, the subject- 
object dichotomy is maintained and domination is reinforced. (1989:43)
W hile my research explicitly avoids dismissing or excluding the voices of the oppressed,
it does depend almost exclusively on the work (my own included) o f white, middle class
academics. To this extent, its pretenses at authority reinforce domination. The fear o f
“ Cyborgs at Large: Interview with Donna Haraway” ; and SI, Introduction to Simians. Cyborgs, and
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reinforcing domination in an otherwise “right-on” paper acts, however, not to paralyze 
me, but only to inspire caution. Rather than taking the easy out and writing about white 
guys simply to offer advice to white guys, I write about white guys in order to refigure 
the divides that separate their voices from other ones.
A related concern, again both topical and methodological, centers around gender 
specifically. In my effort to be a progressive white male and to address the future o f 
leftism in the mainstream environmental movement, I open up new paths for my own 
gender-linked power. As Donna Haraway puts it, "The image of the sensitive man calls 
up, for me, the male person who, while enjoying the position of unbelievable [male] 
privilege, also has the privilege o f gentleness" (Int 19). Throughout her work, however, 
Haraway insists that we must embrace traps like this, for we have no choice but to cast 
our lot somewhere. We are never innocent but always hopeful. More than once,
Haraway describes her own work as a search through "discards from the Western deck of 
cards, [a search] for the trickster figures that might turn a stacked deck into a potent set of 
wild cards for figuring possible worlds." Dutifully pointing out the cultural imperialism 
o f appropriating the trickster figure from Native American and other literatures, Haraway 
situates herself in a network of traps— "in the belly o f the monster"—  trying to point us 
from an “impossible but all too present reality to a possible but all too absent elsewhere" 
(SI 4). As the monster himself, 1 want here to search through the discards and openings 
o f  Cultural Studies and environmental theory in an attempt to point in similar directions.
My project, as I said earlier, is narrow and partial. I ask only a few questions, yet find 
m yself so tangled up in a number o f other questions that my conclusions can only be
Women.
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incomplete. At best, I hope that this paper, composed, after all, in cooperation with 
computers and corporate-patented voice-recognition software, acts as a cyborg in its own 
right— already compromised, miscegenated, “fucked,” and promiscuous— a portable 
textual machine incorporating other people’s metaphors and technologies, my labor, and 
multiple reading environments to generate connections o f unplanned obsolescence and 
unpredictable productivity.^
Left-Environmentalism Runs Awry
The white, middle to upper class, heterosexual male is an often unmarked character, 
whether he is left-environmentalist or not. He is unmarked in the simple sense that many 
people find it utterly unremarkable to be white or middle to upper class or male or 
heterosexual. In telling a story, for example, we are unlikely to remark upon a person’s 
race, class, gender, or sexuality if that person is white, middle to upper class, male, and 
heterosexual. This character’s status as the default setting for humankind is integral—  
cause and effect— to his hegemonic power and to his ability to erase difference and 
reinscribe him self into the system, like a virus, without even writing his name. Like an 
orthographic character, he disseminates, mutates, and reinscribes meaning and power.
The Greek word for character, ethos, tells us more about him; He is a set o f habituations 
or cultural vectors that acts both as a normative paradigm and a system o f kinship— o f 
inclusion and exclusion. Like a dramatic character he can be (but seldom is) described 
with a list of attributes, adjectives, and stories. This paper deliberately writes this
 ̂Gray, Mentor, and Figueroa-Sarriera offer the term omni-cyborg: something that makes “o f  everything 
they interface with a cyborg, like the omni-cyborgian theory o f  articles such as this one” (1995: I4n6).
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character’s name with its descriptives. It exposes him to scrutiny by refusing to allow 
him to define him self merely in terms o f what he is not, but instead in terms of what he 
preserves: the privileged positioning o f whiteness, wealth, heterosexuality, and maleness.
The white, middle to upper class, heterosexual male does not necessarily lack dreams 
for a better world. W ith some exceptions, he is not holding meetings on the top floor o f a 
M anhattan hi-rise, plotting how to reinscribe his power most effectively onto the body 
public. The problem is trickier than this. Take, for example, the rebellious and idealistic 
suburban adolescent male; He can find comfortable causes in atheism, spiritualism, 
individualism, communalism, vagabondism, or environmentalism. I say comfortable 
because, while these causes are not without import or value, there is a reason why they 
are ubiquitous in suburbia and, for instance, concern for labor issues is not. (Labor issues 
challenge too closely the class privilege that rebellious suburban youth enjoy.) Most 
counterculturalism within the Silent Majority and its wealthier cousinry can be read as a 
sort o f  complicity to the tyrannical reign it presumes to question. None of the 
“comfortable” causes listed above, for example, adequately challenges heterocentrism, 
patriarchy, classism, imperialism, racism, or sexism. It seems a little suspicious, a little 
too convenient, then, when people well protected by the regime they were born into 
characterize something like environmentalism (often wilderness preservation, in 
particular) as the political problem of first importance.
Although he may sometimes act like it, the white, middle to upper class, heterosexual 
male is not an ontologically special category. The distinction between him and everyone 
else is not a natural one, awaiting discovery by scientists or philosophers. 1 pay this man 
so much attention only as a limit case for privilege— as a way to test left-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
environmentalism at its tenderest demographic point. The white woman, the light­
skinned mestizo, and the well-to-do gay man, for instance, all have their own special 
privileges and can make for dangerous left-environmentalists in their own right. Neither 
is the Third World lesbian o f color ontologically special. She could stand in as an 
opposite limit case, an idealized privilege-less actor, but to treat her as a poster child or as 
a standard o f reference simplifies extremely complex global circulations of power. 
Nobody enjoys total privilege, nor does anyone lack privilege altogether. To take the 
white, middle to upper class, heterosexual male as seriously as I do here is merely my 
political and practical attempt to call attention to an amorphous problem in left- 
environmentalism and leftism in general.
Left-environmentalism, as practiced by the white, middle to upper class, heterosexual 
male can be dangerous. Its rhetoric and practices easily reinscribe domination through 
tropes like voluntary simplicity and union with nature. The réinscription o f domination 
depends on none o f these tropes in particular. Tropes are not dangerous in and of 
themselves, but domination needs them like music needs instruments. In the following 
pages, I offer a brief bestiary o f left-environmentalist tropes that reveals a network o f 
racism, sexism, classism, imperialism, and heterocentrism in white, middle to upper 
class, heterosexual, male left-environmentalism. My argument does not situate itself 
along the biocentrist-anthropocentrist axis, the monist-dualist axis, or even along the deep 
ecology-social ecology axis. My problem map simply shows one character, the left- 
leaning, white, middle to upper class, heterosexual, male environmentalist, traveling 
through environmentalism and spinning new tropic threads for his own web o f privilege.
I do not discuss environmentalist tropes that have been explicitly incorporated into right-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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wing agendas. Others writers have already noted that risk management, resource 
scarcity, environmental accounting, and the population explosion are all tropes used to 
reinscribe white patriarchy."* I focus, instead, on environmentalist tropes that still occur 
primarily on the left but that end up working to sabotage a left agenda.
Take, for example, voluntary simplicity (not to be confused with the paranoid and 
racist survivalist movement o f the extreme right). The “simple life” is meant to replace 
the capitalist supply-demand treadmill with a cooperative society o f plenty, but it is 
generally advocated and practiced by financially secure people and is facilitated by an 
initial position of excess. Going “back to the land” involves selecting certain privileges 
and amenities to relinquish and others to retain, choosing what to live without but 
retaining the power to get it back if  desired. Simple living obscures privilege enough to 
allow very privileged people to dress in blue collar chic, while they, at the same time, can 
look down on the poor for buying packaged foods or driving big cars. Conveniently, 
voluntary simplicity also justifies apoliticality, because after paring down the number o f 
social issues we are concerned with, we can concentrate entirely on what we consider 
“basic” to life and not get hung up on issues like gunboat diplomacy or sexual harassment 
in the workplace. These other problems, the simple liver may think, are only 
symptomatic of a misdirected, “complex” life.
As another example, consider left-environmentalists’ glorified idea o f backpacking. 
Similar to hunting and fishing in the right-environmentalist discourse of “sportsmen,” this 
trope constitutes an important part of most left-leaning environmentalists’ self-image— so
* For example, Luke (1997), Seager (1993), Guha (1989), and Ross (1994), and essays in Bullard, ed. 
(1993).
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much so, that left-environmentalists seem to spend more time feeling guilty about not 
going backpacking than actually going backpacking. Being a backpacker is also the self- 
identification most inspired by and inspirational to mainstream environmentalism. Like 
voluntary simplicity, backpacking is most often a pastime of the white middle and upper 
classes. A window shopping trip (and it is all about shopping) to outfit my partner for an 
imaginary three-day, late fall backpacking trip runs up a tall bill. I quote as examples 
prices o f name brand gear at a conspicuous, downtown shop because these name brands 
and their advertising photography seem to define the outdoor experience of a true 
“backpacker.”
Thorlo®  hiking socks $15.75x3
Layers® Therm ion™  long underwear $46.95
FoxRiver® Polypropylene liner socks $5.95x3
Layers® Polartec'"''^ fleece pants $38.95
M arm ot®  fleece sweater $119.00
M arm ot®  Polartec™ fleece pullover $89.00
Sierra Designs''"'^ rain suit $58.50 (on sale)
Asolo® 52QTM hiking boots $108.00 (on sale)
TurtleFur®  hat $34.00
A rc’Teryx® Bora 65’' '̂̂  internal frame pack $320.00
Sierra Designs® W yatt Earp^w
Polarguard 30'^'^ zero degree sleeping bag $200.00
Outdoor Research® Gore-Tex™  mittens $62.00
Timberline® water filter $25.00
L icam p®  Lexan'*'*^ Eating Utensils $0.95x3
Petzl® M icro™  head lamp $24.00
Quantum ®  Buzz Away^M insect repellent $6.00
M SR ®  Whisperlite International™ stove $69.95
M SR ®  fuel bottle $8.95
M SR ®  quart o f  white gas $5.00
M SR ®  Titan™  titanium cookset $89.00
N algene®  water bottles $7.95x2
Cam elbak®  Aeroform Reservoir"^ $24.95
Therm -A -Rest®  sleeping pad $50.00 (on sale)
Horny Toad Active W ear® Anacapa^w scarf $30.00
Chem aA rm or®  Personal Defense Weapon^M
Bear/survivalist spray $21.95
And so, without a tent, or even food, the bill for a three-day walk in the woods comes to 
$1515.05. While not many people go and buy all these items at once, the list above
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11
reflects what a self-respecting backpacking environmentalist “needs” and what my peers 
in a mid-sized Environmental Studies department actually seem to have. The backpacker 
is easily inspired to protect wildlands for recreating in, but because backpacking is so 
expensive, people from other tax brackets rarely visit these same places. The wilderness 
retreat, one might say, is no more than a getaway from politics, accountability, and the 
horribly unaesthetic poor. The wilderness preserve, similarly, acts as a reservoir for 
privilege, a gated community disguised as nature.
Another tropic maneuver o f left-environmentalism is to speak o f our debt to “Mother 
Earth.” While, in some ways, this planet does act as a “womb” or generative matrix, our 
impulse to gender everything (witness gendered nouns in most European languages) 
surely has become suspect by now. Joni Seager identifies a few of the main political 
problems with M other Earth imagery. First,
It suggests a benign distribution o f  power and responsibility, one that establishes an erroneous 
and dangerous assumption about the relations between us and the environment. It obfuscates 
the power relations that are really involved when we try to sort out w h o ’s controlling what, and 
w h o ’s responsible for what, in the environmental crisis. It is not an effective political 
organizing tool; I f  the earth is really our mother, then we are children, and cannot be held fully 
accountable for our actions. (219)
Casting planet as mother helps us to ignore human power differentials because they
become small potatoes in the shadow o f the Earth’s matriarchal and benevolent rule. It
gives us room to take some of our mess seriously while assuming that other parts o f it
will eventually get cleaned up like the urine stains we leave on the toilet. The sexism of
the M other Earth image is also disconcerting. “In a patriarchal culture in which female
status is cast as subservient status, there are inherent pitfalls in sex-typing an inherently
gender-free entity” (ibid.). These dangers are that the Earth will be treated like we treat
women— as resource, as lesser— and that, at the same time, we will limit women’s
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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identities to “earthly” qualities like care, intuition, and reproduction (leaving power, 
logic, and culture for men). Furthering gender dualisms when most, if not all, o f our 
dualisms are used as hierarchies to justify oppression cannot make for a very consistently 
leftist environmentalism.
Another set o f left-leaning white environmentalist tropes deals with ethnic and 
cultural diversity. Most New Age, hippie, and world music consumer cultures have a 
dual worship of nature and of those humans they consider close to nature. In a perversely 
imperialistic maneuver. Native Americans and Tibetans become the ultimate charismatic 
megafauna for German and U.S. greens, with Native Americans often being identified 
with animal totems. Senegalese guitarists, South Asian sitarists, and Native American 
flautists garner much adoration but only end up fulfilling the dictum that for a person of 
color to be famous in the U.S., s/he must be an entertainer. All this worship comes to a 
crashing halt when Makah go whaling, Amazon peoples wear Nikes, or Inuits watch 
television.^ We like our world multicultural, but only superficially, as a way of 
disguising our own whiteness. As bell hooks notes in “Eating the Other,” “Within 
commodity culture, ethnicity becomes spice, seasoning that can liven up the dull dish that 
is mainstream white culture” (21). White multiculturalism seeks to act out fantasies 
about contact with the Other but tends to do so in a way that preserves the status quo. 
When white multiculturalist environmentalists performatively fraternize with or idolize 
individuals or cultures that they imagine fit on the “nature” side o f the nature/culture
 ̂ White viewers looking for Native American characters to idolize may also be disappointed in indigenous 
films like D ance Me O utside  or Sm oke Signals. These works trouble the image o f  the noble savage by 
showing ways reservation life can be less than ideal and by implying guilt on the part o f  white society for 
some o f  the problems o f  contemporary Native America.
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divide, they perpetuate a harmful dichotomy and disingenuously privilege the “natives” 
on their side while secretly congratulating themselves on their own.
Related to this fetishization o f non-white ethnicity is the environmentalist call for us 
to lose control, to merge with the natural world. In the case o f two movement rituals, 
m arijuana use and meditative walks in the woods, attempts by the privileged 
environmentalist to lose control often end up reinscribing privilege. A white, male 
environmentalist, for example, might smoke marijuana and lose control in a way that 
remains totally in control. He decides when to dissolve and when to sober up, and the 
basically private nature o f drug use means that he need not be confronted, while 
chemically compromised, by anything too far outside o f his realm of comfort. Likewise, 
during a meditative walk in the woods, our character might work toward breaking down 
his sense o f individual agency in favor o f a broader union with the ecosphere, but in the 
woods, he takes the opportunity to leave other responsibilities behind and to simulate the 
ultimate state o f power; oneness with totality. Perversely, Seager notes, when practiced 
by privileged female environmentalists, the same rituals can actually disempower, rather 
than empower.
For centuries wom en have been told that they have no singular identity. Women have always 
been subsumed by culture and men, and denied independent existence. Selflessness, 
unbounded oneness, total connectedness, and denial o f  independent identity have been central 
to  w o m e n ’s oppression. (235)
In this light, suggesting that women should dissolve themselves into the ecosphere
through drug use or meditation works reactionarily to reverse gains women have made in
establishing separate agency. And, o f course, both white men and white women become
suspect when they fetishize other cultures as paradigms for surrendering independent
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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agency. White superiority is asserted when Native Americans, for example, are 
considered role models in this way when, in reality, they have a strong tradition of 
sophisticated political agency, and any control lost by them was probably stolen.
Seager also touches on the final left-environmentalist trope I will discuss: 
professionalization within the environmental movement. The professionalization o f left- 
environmentalism began in the 1980s with the rapid membership growth o f many major 
environmental non-profits* and continued into the 1990s with a bloom of academic 
departments devoted to environmental issues.^ Without essentializing men or women, 
Seager points out that professionalization often means increased male control and 
decreased valuation o f the “feminine.” The growth o f respectability in the environmental 
movement came with a turn away from its diverse grassroots elements and toward a 
reincarnation of its original history as a m en’s club pastime. Women in leading 
environmentalist jobs must mirror the image of the successful corporate woman of the 
1980s: clean-cut but sexy... a “ballbreaker.”
The newly professionalized environmental m ovement is one in which “ pragmatics” and 
“credibility” are given privilege over “emotionalism,” which is equated with “amateurism.”
Increasing primacy is given to slick communication skills, pragmatic politics and a 
professional appearance— as measured by the most conventional yardsticks. The “reasonable 
m an” is replacing the “emotional w om an” as a green archetype, a presumptive dualism that 
diminishes both men and women. (187)
M ale/female dualisms are unconsciously reinscribed as left-environmentalism infiltrates
the old-boys network and vice versa. The incessant call among environmentalist ranks to
“Do the science!” plays into this valuation of the “masculine,” as science is still
considered a male domain. Professionalism, in general, also works to hide political
See Dunlap and Mertig, eds. (1992).
 ̂ For N ew  York Times M agazine's  take on this, see Parini (1995).
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interest under the masks of objectivity, logic, and compromise. While this may help 
environmentalist agendas become policy, it can also help the race, class, and gender 
interests o f environmentalists pass as pragmatism and not politics.
It may seem that, without knowing it, I am leaning toward an agenda similar to the 
left-environmentalism of Murray Bookchin. Indeed, Bookchin’s social ecology intends 
to move beyond the réinscription of hegemony in environmental movements such as deep 
ecology. The hypothesis that our environmental crisis is a mere symptom of our 
diseased, exploitative social structure, however, is simplistic at best. And this kind of 
search for a “root cause” o f our problems usually divides, more than unites, 
environmentalists.® Social ecology tends, in its suggestions for revolution, to 
underestimate or wish away the inertia of white, middle to upper class, heterosexual, 
male privilege. To argue, as a leftist, that we should all just become socialist-anarchists 
is irresponsible in that it offers no coherent strategy for dealing with the potential 
persistence of patriarchal privilege. If, as Bookchin seems to think, it were as easy as just 
realizing that there is enough stuff to go around and that we ought to love one another, 
then the Beatles would have fixed everything 30 years ago. Leftism is inescapably 
utopian but must stay cognizant o f its historical conditions; not free to be no-place-at-all, 
it moves around in a very sticky mess.
Attention to the actual workings o f left-environmentalist tropes reveals an 
exceedingly tricky (and sticky) conservation of privilege. The trick behind it all seems to 
be environmentalism’s ideological monopoly on the “natural.” Any ideology would like 
to think o f itself as natural, as fairly straightforward and uncontingent, in order to distract
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from the messy, questionable, and negotiable aspects o f its political claims. With 
environmentalist ideology, however, nature and the natural lie at the very center o f 
attention. In a circular twist of logic, environmentalism becomes the natural ideology 
because it strives to protect the natural.^ As an expert on or voice for the natural, 
environmentalism wins the power to deal in distinctions between natural and unnatural—  
members o f an imperfect dichotomy— and thus claims an awesome power to authorize or 
discredit narratives. The contingent and political nature o f the act o f distinguishing 
between natural and unnatural is hidden, and environmentalism becomes the single most 
important political cause. At its tamest, this means that democracy and social politics are 
overshadowed by sincere efforts to save rivers and trees; at its worst, it means that 
hegemonic practices can be dressed up in the robes o f environmental activism or 
ecological imperative.'® The cyborg, an entity with a promiscuously ambiguous 
relationship to nature, may be o f use here.
Prelude to the Cyborg
Cyborgs abound. From designer tomatoes to people with pacemakers, mergers o f 
technology and organism no longer appear exclusively in comic books. We have (been) 
assimilated. Donna Haraway finds both danger and promise in this transgression of one 
o f  our most sacred boundaries: the nature/artifice divide. Although the cyborg predates
* See Ellis (1996).
Thanks to Bill Chaloupka for thoughts on this.
The stock example here is the connection between environmentalism and genocide in Nazi Germany. 
Appeals to maintain the “natural” state o f  Northern Europe led to both conservation o f  trees and 
extermination o f  “ impure” races. See Ferry, (19xx).
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Haraw ay,' ’ she is one o f its most important surrogate parents. Because we will 
ultimately be discussing the potential of Haraway's figuration o f the cyborg to help with 
the problems of privileged left-environmentalism, I here essay an idiosyncratic retelling 
o f her theory. An author entirely excessive with tropes and comfortable with ambiguity, 
Haraway perhaps prefers idiosyncratic interpretations. I will unabashedly recontextualize 
her use o f the cyborg trope in ways that my political commitments and philosophical 
training suggest— looking first at her politics and philosophy, next discussing her 
thoughts on cyborgs, and closing with the question of cyborg gender.
H araw ay's work is hard to categorize. Moving freely between disciplines like 
w om en’s studies, anthropology, cultural studies, biology and biochemistry, history of 
science, literary criticism, and science fiction, it frustrates some people to no end.'^ 
Haraw ay’s work is flamboyant, but there is something productive about it. Throughout 
her interventions into multiple disciplines, Haraway consistently incorporates a strong 
socialist, feminist, anti-nuclear, anti-racist, and anti-heterocentrist agenda as well as 
complex theoretical arguments— making her somewhat o f a cult figure for the 
“postmodern” left.'^ Since Haraway’s philosophical commitments are integral to how 
she envisions the cyborg and how the cyborg might be useful to my character, I will 
spend a few pages unpacking them.
"  Som e w ould  argue that cyborgs have always been around, but the word was probably first used by 
scientist Manfred Clynes in 1960 to describe a man-machine coupling he believed would allow space 
travel.
Recently, ! found m yse lf  on a plane sitting next to a Boston University anthropologist who, noticing I 
was read ing  Haraway’s latest book, went to great lengths to argue that H araway 's  anthropological work is 
unfounded in science and should be discounted entirely. “She just put something out in a journal in my 
field,” he said, “and reading it, you’re ju s t  like "where the hell is this coming from ?” ’
”  See, for example. W ired M agazine 's  portrayal o f  her (Kunzru 1997),
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Haraway’s writing boils down to a discussion of semiotics. In the mechanics o f 
meaning, Haraway believes, lies the key to understanding most o f what we can 
understand (and change) about our world. Meaning is not a simple thing, though. The 
world is not a book waiting to be read (by scientists), an object waiting to be named (by 
Adam), or a blank slate waiting to be filled (by postmodernists). Meaning making is not 
an act that occurs separately from the world. Meaning and the world are, instead, 
intricately tied up in a process Haraway calls articulation.
She uses this term (articulation) in a play on its etymological connections to concepts 
o f expression, segmentedness, and connectedness. Expression, segmentation, and 
connection occur on material as well as semiotic planes. For instance, genes and orators 
both express themselves; vertebrae and sentences are both segmented; and ideas and 
molecules can both be connected. Articulation, Haraway argues, even occurs across the 
divide between material and semiotic. Language plays a role in the articulation o f the 
material world, and the material world plays a part in the construction o f language. 
Haraway invokes a mushy material-semiotic cosmos, pulsing with articulation:
Language is the effect o f  articulation, and so are bodies.. . .  Nature may be speechless, without 
language, in the human sense; but nature is highly articulate. Discourse is only one process o f  
articulation. An articulated world has an undecidable number o f  nodes and sites where 
connections can be made. The surfaces o f  this kind o f  world are not frictionless curved planes. 
Unlike things can be jo ined— and like things broken apart— and vice versa. (PM 324)
In this kind o f world we continually interact with other actors (human and otherwise) to 
reconnect the ways our world is strung together. Actors are material-semiotic entities, 
simultaneously bodily and discursive, always collective in articulation. Together they 
make up the complex material-semiotic system we call “reality.’' Material-semiotic 
actors, or nodes, could be words, people, laws, bears, winds, electrons, pulsars, or
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anything that acts like a unit in a material-semiotic world. Such nodes appear, sometimes 
only ephemerally, as the result of articulation and they continue on to make new 
articulations. “Their boundaries materialize in social interaction among humans and non­
hum ans” (298). The boundaries between material-semiotic actors are real but only in a 
weak sense.
“Objects” like bodies do not pre-exist as such. Similarly, “nature” cannot pre-exist as such, but 
neither is its existence ideological. Nature is a commonplace and a powerful discursive 
construction, effected in the interactions among material-semiotic actors, human and not.. . .
[It] is not a ghost, merely a protean trickster, (ibid.)
The tricky realness o f nature and material-semiotic actors suggests the need for a tricky 
way o f understanding reality and truth and for an epistemology that avoids stripping the 
world down to a passive resource for language.
As a material-semiotic mush, the world never stays still long enough to be figured 
out, but it nevertheless makes claims on us. “This world must always be articulated, from 
people’s points o f view, through ‘situated knowledges,” ’ through truth claims that make 
no attempt to transcend embodiedness (313). Situated knowledges are neither relativistic, 
nor hegemonic. They embrace
sim ultaneously  an account o f  radical historical contingency for all knowledge claims and 
know ing subjects, a critical practice for recognizing our own ‘semiotic technologies’ for 
m aking  meanings, and  a no-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts o f  a ‘rea l’ world, one 
that can be partially shared and friendly to earth-wide projects o f  finite freedom, adequate 
material abundance, modest meaning in suffering, and limited happiness. (SK 187)
Haraway proclaims that, from where she is standing, “Objectivity turns out to be about
particular and specific embodiment, and definitely not about the false vision promising
transcendence o f all limits and responsibility” (190). Objectivity is a form of articulation,
always partial and never complete.
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Situated knowledges are also always already political; they are “partial in the sense of 
being /h r [and in\ some worlds and not others. There is no way around this polluting 
criterion for strong objectivity” (MW 37). We are embodied, thus interested, thus 
political. In meaning-making, we end up throwing our articulative weight in certain 
directions but not in others. Apoliticality is only a deceptive guise. That our articulations 
and truth claims are political means that the effort to police the divide between spin and 
truth may fail.
Stories and facts do not naturally keep a respectable distance; indeed, they promiscuously 
cohabit the same very material places. Determining what constitutes each dimension takes 
boundary-making and maintenance work. (68)
This work is done by different people with different ends in mind. The articulation of 
fact requires a non-innocent process o f sorting through stories and reworking boundaries. 
Haraway’s epistemology highlights non-innocence and leaves to those committed to 
faithful, political accounts o f embodied reality “the confusing task o f making partial, real 
connection” with the world (CM 161). We can take facts seriously at the same time as 
seeing them as stories. We can argue that some acts o f boundary maintenance need more 
troubling and reworking than others. “Some differences are playful; some are poles o f 
world historical systems o f domination. ‘Epistemology’ is about knowing the difference” 
(ibid.).
Haraway’s call to distinguish between playful and dangerous difference suggests an 
interesting take on modernity’s penchant for dividing the world into twos. Haraway does 
not take dualisms, like material/semiotic, at face value, but neither does she dismiss them 
completely.
Certain dualisms have been persistent in Western traditions; they have all been systemic to the 
logics and practices o f  domination o f  women, people o f  color, nature, workers, animals— in
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short, domination o f  all constituted as others, whose task is to mirror the self. Chief  among 
these troubling dualisms are self/other, mind/body, culture/nature, male/female, 
civilized/primitive, reality/appearance, whole/part, agent/resource, maker/made, active/passive, 
right/wrong, truth/iilusion, total/partial, God/man. (CM 177)
The dualisms Haraway lists are the currency o f modernity, o f its domination of the other,
and o f its alienation o f the self. Haraway argues that to be the self o f the left side o f these
dualisms is illusory and that it means surviving entirely through the other, who acts as an
invisible resource. The unmarked self (well-off, white, straight, etc.) is defined only by
not being what the invisible other is (poor, black, queer, etc.). In a sense, then, the self
has no ontology o f its own. The other, denied a selfhood of its own, is called upon to
labor on the selfhood o f the unmarked, and is thus left “frayed, insubstantial,” lost in
space between the two poles o f a dualism that the self has created.
Dualisms, Haraway reminds us, are not going to disappear from our worldview any
time soon. They form the very structure o f much of our experience (inside/outside,
true/false, etc.). Even Haraway’s own arguments depend on dualism—themselves
drawing distinctions between nature and culture, science and deconstruction. The key,
for Haraway, is to keep an ambivalent relationship to dualisms and to transgress as much
as use them. For her, “One is too few, but two are too many” (ibid.). If  we accept this,
we find that troubling our dualisms will not necessarily result in the fragmentation of the
unary or in the unification of the dual. We are left with dualisms that sometimes make
sense and sometimes do not, that are productive but sometimes painful and always
contestable.
Such an understanding of dualism inspires Haraway to critique both science and 
deconstruction (two practices she has strong commitments to) for their policing of the
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distinction between truth and illusion. Haraway considers it impossible for science to
discover truth or for deconstruction to show that truth is simply an illusion. Any claim
about the verity o f a single, scientific view or about the equal truth-value of all views
assumes a transcendent viewpoint, a view from nowhere. Haraway insists that we are not
transcendent, that we are trapped in a context, and thus that we cannot make a solid
distinction between truth and illusion, fact and perspective.
Scientific discourses, without ever ceasing to be radically and historically specific, do 
still make claims on you .. . .  No scientific account escapes being story-laden, but it is 
equally true that stories are not all equal here. Radical relativism just w o n ’t do as a way 
o f  finding your way across and through these terrains. (Int 2)
Science can show us that certain accounts o f the world have more empirical relevance
than others, but it can never escape perspective or discourse. What scientists choose to
ask, how they frame their investigation, and how they interpret their results are all
colored by economic, political, and social context. Deconstruction helps us see that
perspective matters and that truth is not simply “discovered,” but it does nothing to
change the fact that some things are simply more real to us than others. Deconstruction
does not vaporize truth claims. It merely shows them to be implicated in networks o f
power and meaning and, thus, to be both real and contestable. Radical relativism just
doesn’t make sense to us empirically (or morally) if  we accept our embodiedness.
These ideas are not new. Hilary Putnam, for instance, argues that we must “see 
relativism andXhe desire for a metaphysical foundation as manifestations o f the same
One might note that it is an exaggeration to portray mainstream science as denying that it speaks from a 
perspective or deconstruction as being blindly relativistic. Ironically, Haraway feeds into the exaggerations 
o f  her UCSC colleagues, Gary Lease and Michael Souié, who have argued that deconstruction rejects the 
idea o f  a real world and has anti-environmental tendencies (1995; xv). Caricatures o f  science and 
deconstruction, however, are common to contemporary academia and its attached publishing industries, 
which seem to thrive on exaggerating schisms and aporias.
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disease”— this disease being the inability to accept that we are embodied, that we have no 
less and no more than embodied knowledge, knowledge from a context (177). 
“ Something in us both craves more than we can possibly have and flees from even the 
certainty that we do have,” writes Putnam (178). Like Haraway, Putnam seeks a middle 
ground between scientism and deconstruction qua relativism. Haraway advocates a 
common sense appreciation o f what both science and deconstruction can do for us. Each 
tells part of the story o f how we, as embodied beings, actually relate to dualisms like 
truth/illusion. She challenges us to “give up mastery but keep searching for fidelity, 
knowing all the while we will be hoodwinked” (SK 199). This modest yet demanding 
project sets the stage for the cyborg.
The Cyborg
The cyborg appeared midway through Haraway’s career, in the mid-1980s, and 
achieved notoriety in 1985 with the Socialist Review's publication of “Manifesto for 
Cyborgs; Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s.” (The essay has 
since appeared elsewhere in revised versions and has inspired a rash o f work by other 
scholars.'^) In the 1980s, the conditions o f  world systems o f domination underwent 
significant changes: Military-industrial complexes became “polymorphous, information 
systems” symbolized, for Haraway, by the U.S. military’s mid-1980s organizational 
principle, “C^I” (command-control-communication-intelligence) (CM 161, 150).
The “ M anifesto” also appears in Haraway (1991) and Brown University Staff (1989). 1 quote the 1991 
version in this paper. Some works dealing heavily with the “Manifesto” include Balsamo (1996), 
com m entaries in Brown University Staff (1989), and many o f  the essays appearing in Gray, ed. (1995).
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At issue in the “Manifesto” are two strategic questions, really: What direction should 
feminism take? And what direction should leftism in general take? When Haraway was 
writing the “Manifesto,” New Age culture was growing in popularity, and goddess 
worship, pagan revival, and anti-technological fetishization of indigenous peoples had 
become cultural practice for many feminists. While this was in part a successful effort to 
get beyond the paternalism o f white, second wave feminism, it made some feminists, 
including Haraway, nervous. Meanwhile, leftism was still pushing a more or less 
industrial-era agenda, fighting hard to keep auto factories operating in the Midwest. In 
1985, computers were common but crude, and the information highway consisted of 
slow, obscure BBS technology. That, at such a time, Haraway looked to the cyborg for 
strategy is a statement o f her frustration with technophobic feminisms and plodding 
leftists.
The cyborg, more properly called the cybernetic organism, takes its name from tire 
science o f cybernetics, which explores the idea that computers and organisms are not that 
different from each other in that they can both be understood as systems of information 
exchange. In this sense, any organism is a computer: It operates through control systems 
that regulate the flow o f genetic, electrical, and chemical information units. Add to this 
the realizations that writing and other communications are technologies for control o f 
information exchange and that social structures such as religion, law, fashion, and 
sexuality are all systems of information flow, and you start to see that almost everything 
can be considered a cybernetic organism. Haraway argues that, in an age of artificial 
intelligence, prosthetic surgery, evolutionary theory, and nanotechnology, the differences
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between machine and human, animal and human, and rhaterial and immaterial, for 
instance, come into question.
As a result, Haraway tells us, “one should expect control strategies to concentrate on 
boundary conditions and interfaces, on rates o f flow across” (163). The power to control 
the interfaces between categories lies primarily with the privileged and is guarded 
jealously. White men capitalize on blurred boundaries by manipulating them for their 
own ends. During World War II, for example, women were told that the 
male : female : : active :passi ve analogy did not hold and that they could and should be active 
à la Rosie the Riveter. As soon as the need for wom en’s labor waned (and in fact 
presented an economic threat to returning soldiers), women were told once more that they 
were passive entities. Similarly, before Native Americans were guaranteed the right to 
vote in the United States, having even a very low degree o f Native American blood could 
be cause for disenfranchisement. The government at that time was intent on assimilating 
tribal lands, and any aboriginal votes would have represented a threat to that agenda. 
Therefore, the boundaries of the category “Native American” were widened. Nowadays, 
however, the same boundary is being policed in the opposite way. Prominent institutions 
like Stanford University (or many federal programs, for that matter) require official 
documentation proving that Native American applicants are enrolled in state or federally 
recognized tribes or have high enough degrees of Native blood to be considered under 
University affirmative action policies. Affirmative action can be viewed as representing 
a threat to a white m an’s admission to a university, and federal programs for enrolled 
Indians cost money. This helps explain, in part, why the boundaries o f the category 
“Native American” have been narrowed o f late.
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The cyborg, Haraway believes, is well equipped to understand the war over coding 
and thus becomes a powerful metaphor for feminism and leftism. Itself occupying the 
borderlands between man and machine, natural and artificial, the cyborg notices right 
away when categories are shifted or erased. In teclmoculture, the world reads like 
“problems in communications engineering (for the managers) or theories o f the text (for 
those who would resist),” and, Haraway points out, “Both are cyborg sémiologies” (163). 
The cyborg acts both as the “fiction mapping our social and bodily reality and as an 
imaginative resource” suggesting possibilities for resistance and reformulation of that 
reality (150). Cyborgs are the products o f patriarchal, military-capitalist technology, but 
Haraway reassures us that “illegitimate offspring are often exceedingly unfaithful to their 
origins” (151). Cyborgs can just as easily be revolutionary subjects as guardians o f the 
status quo. “The political struggle is to see from both perspectives at once because each 
reveals both dominations and possibilities unimaginable from the other vantage point” 
( 154).
Incorporating cyborg consciousness into feminism and leftism does several things. 
First, it makes boundaries seem movable rather than natural. If  we understand that we 
are cyborgs, we can better read the (operating) system and invent paths for hacking that 
system and causing stress. Haraway terms this the “struggle against perfect 
communication” (176), the effort to disrupt ways those in power regulate the way 
everyone else receives and transmits information. The cyborg, a potentially sophisticated 
and strategic situated knower, feels at home in this kind of politics. It attempts nothing 
more than to take "^pleasure in the confusion of boundaries, and... responsibility in their 
construction” (150).
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Second, the cyborg is equipped to see itself as a material-semiotic actor occupying a 
landscape that is no less real for being discursive.'® The cyborg knows that existing in a 
material and discursive world means having identities and standpoints; it means having 
weight and interest in the system. The cyborg participates in the process o f articulation 
with this in mind. This is part o f what Haraway means when she continually insists that 
we must “cast our lot somewhere.” We hack in(to) the system for reasons, impure 
reasons, so we can never be innocently revolutionary or “simply oppositional” (MW 3). 
The disruption of the system of boundaries always means redrawing them, not escaping 
from them altogether. Leftists in general and feminists in particular often hold the idea 
that their cause is that o f the innocent and violated. For Haraway, this is delusional. As 
embodied actors in a material-semiotic landscape, we are always implicated and always 
interested. H alf organism, half machine, the cyborg’s “natural” state is miscegenation, 
“The cyborg skips the step o f original unity, o f identification with nature in the Western 
sense. This is its illegitimate promise that might lead to subversion of its teleology as star 
wars” (CM 151).
Haraway argues that resistance movements start to work differently when we think in 
these terms. New possibilities for coalitions open up, for instance, when we substitute 
cyborg feminism for essentialist feminisms that concretize gender structures by goddess 
worship or erase racial and other politics by defining “woman’s experience” in originary 
terms.
For one thing, as Anne Balsam o’s Technologies o f  the Gendered Body does a good job o f  reminding us, 
discourse does not operate in a simply hyperreal, immaterial realm, but actually works to shape real, 
material bodies (1996).
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From the perspective o f  cyborgs, freed o f  the need to ground politics in ‘o u r ’ privileged 
position o f  the oppression that incorporates all other dominations, the innocence o f  the merely 
violated, the ground o f  those closer to nature, we can see partial possibilities. (176)
Too often, Haraway fears, specific groups of resistance miss out on potential alliances
because they are too caught up in their self-image as “merely violated.” The cyborg, she
believes, can embrace a greatly broadened feminist and leftist coalition politics. It can
treat identity as unstable but important and redraw the boundaries o f its own constituency
at strategic intervals— sometimes allowing capitalists to be on its side, sometimes
allowing computer jocks on board, and so on. The cyborg leftist can work against
racism, sexism, heterocentrism, and imperialism while still leaving quite a lot open for
play. Haraway suggests, then, that a cyborg might prefer the concept o f “affinity groups”
to that o f “identity groups,” The cyborg would encourage multiple and often ironic
connections (jointings, in the sense of articulation) that are entirely re workable.
In the end, Haraway leaves us, and cyborgian politics, with two linked, unsettling 
problems. First, the cyborg is anything but necessarily liberating, and second, some 
people are more likely than others to make bad cyborgs (“bad” in the simplified sense of 
the battle between the “good” cyborg and the “bad” cyborg in Terminator 2). In answer 
to an interviewer’s fear that the cyborg could usher in technofascism, Haraway suggests 
that such fear is warranted but should not paralyze us. The cyborg just “ /s bereft o f 
secure guarantees” (Int 7). Haraway prefers working within the dangerous social reality 
o f our cyborg existence to giving up completely, or to inventing false guarantees o f 
purity, identity, or necessity. Part of working without guarantees, however, means 
keeping a watchful eye on one’s own actions. Accordingly, Haraway continually 
emphasizes the dangers o f privileged actors doing cyborg resistance work. She doggedly
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figures herself both “as an insider and an outsider to the hegemonic powers and 
discourses o f my European and North American legacies” (MW 2) and worries about her 
own essentialization of Third World women (SK 191) and her colonization of Native 
American trickster metaphorics (Int 7). She knows that there is danger not only in 
playing with the tropes of military technology but also in having a privileged voice, a 
voice that has a tendency to reinscribe the conditions for its own power. Most important 
for this paper, and least developed in Haraway’s own work, is the danger of men trying to 
be leftist cyborgs.
Chela Sandoval, a former student o f Haraway’s often cited in Haraway’s own work, 
offers a hopeful (but somewhat parenthetical) perspective on male cyborgs. Her essay, 
“New Sciences: Cyborg Feminism and the Methodology of the Oppressed,” makes the 
basic argument that the oppressed have always practiced cyborg politics. The oppressed 
necessarily know how to be hackers and tricksters because they know all too well that 
boundaries are not real and that they are continually rewritten by the powerful to maintain 
hegemony. What Haraway’s “Manifesto” does, Sandoval suggests, is show that the 
wisdom o f the oppressed can be used to bridge the apartheid o f all different domains o f 
leftism. Cyborgism, with its aptitude for flexible couplings, can link feminist subjects o f 
various identity groups and theoretical persuasions and, even, “could very well bring the 
politics o f the alienated white male subject into alliance with the subaltern politics o f U.S. 
third world feminism” (409). This last claim, while intriguing, seems a bit dissonant with 
H araway’s agenda. While it is true that the cyborg metaphor could prove empowering to 
disaffected white men living in the coding structures o f technoculture, one could argue 
that, like the oppressed, the privileged have always been cyborgs. Manipulating
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boundaries, redirecting information flow, and shifting identities are already part of the 
white male methodology of control. After all, in Haraway’s words, control and resistance 
are both cyborg sémiologies. Even if  Sandoval means that cyborg politics is good news 
for alienated leftist, white males, her statement (not discussed in any detail) merits 
substantiation and further qualification.
Haraway’s own treatment o f the issue o f the male cyborg is tellingly conflicted. She 
does write that as technoculture blurs the boundaries around categories such as “natural,” 
“corporate executives reading Playboy and anti-porn radical feminists will make strange 
bedfellows in jointly unmasking the irrationalism [of naturalized sex roles]” (CM 162). 
However, when asked in an interview to consider how a sympathetic man might read the 
final line in her “M anifesto” (“I’d rather be a cyborg than a goddess”), Haraway comes 
o ff as extremely suspicious o f potential male participation in her project.
T here ’s a way in which the sensitive man is the androgynous figure, the figure who is even 
m ore complete than the macho figure. And more dangerous. T hat’s my resistance to the fact 
that 1 do  like sensitive folks o f  all sexes. But the image o f  the sensitive man calls up, for me, 
the male person who, while enjoying the position o f  unbelievable privilege, also has the 
privilege o f  gentleness. Then it’s a version o f  male feminism o f  which I am very suspicious.
On the other hand, that line is written to and for women, and I think I never imagined how a 
man might read it. . . .  [My cyborg] is a polychromatic girl.. .  who hasn’t really figured out a 
politics that makes the necessary articulations with the boys who are your allies. Its undone 
work. (Int 19, 20)
This quote, with its mixed tone of gravity and ambivalence, exhibits an obvious 
reluctance to go where Sandoval does with the “Manifesto.” In the same spirit, while 
Haraway’s troping on cyborg consciousness interests me as a leftist and as an 
environmentalist and while Sandoval’s optimism appeals to me, I feel obligated to 
engage both cautiously. To explore how environmentalism might fit into the whole
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
31
puzzle, let’s turn now to a consideration of how the cyborg has been used in left- 
environmentalist theory.
Cyborg Environmentalism
Haraway maintains a certain distance from environmentalist discourse in her writing. 
She is more likely, for instance, to describe an act o f “solidarity” with animals than to 
speak of our duty toward living things (PM 319). And though she emphasizes that non­
human entities are actors in the articulation of worlds, she stops short of the common 
argument that if plants and animals are agents, we have moral obligations to them. For 
this reason, many people get frustrated with her “for not finally saying what the bottom 
line is on these things; they say well do you or don’t you believe that nonhuman actors 
are in some sense social agents?” (Int 4). Her answer is intentionally ambiguous; “The 
subjects are cyborg, nature is coyote, and the geography is elsewhere” (ibid.).
While Haraway shies away from environmentalist discourse, she does imply how 
cyborgism might transform environmentalism. As “coyote,” nature evades being cast as 
whole, pure, or transcendent and becomes an active, social construction, continually 
being reworked and rearticulated on a shifting terrain. This would make it necessary for 
much environmentalism to seriously reconsider how blithely it proclaims what nature is 
and ought be. Environmentalism can no longer be the political movement with the 
apolitical cause. Its tropes express historically specific and irreducibly heterogenous 
“hopes, fears, and contradictory histories,” not the will or essence of Earth (SI 3). The 
environmentalist in this discourse is entirely bound up in a process o f articulation, living 
in the partial yet embodied landscape o f boundary work.
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Cyborg consciousness calls into question the parts o f environmentalism that make 
Haraway uncomfortable. It warns that hegemonic practices can be imported into 
definitions o f the “natural.” It also reminds technophobic strains o f environmentalism 
that the division between technological and natural is less than clear and that much can be 
accomplished by transgressing that division. Finally, the cyborg challenges 
environmentalists to see that the health o f the ecosystem is just one o f many important 
things to fight for, that racism, classism, etc., will not go away when everyone learns to 
recycle, and that hegemonic practices continue to permeate environmentalist discourse.
As a case in point, Haraway discusses a magazine article about how Kayapo Indians are 
using video technology to help protest the construction of a hydroelectric dam on their 
land.'^ The article’s author, obviously identifying as environmentalist and pro- 
indigenous, portrays the situation as an odd meeting o f the technological and the 
traditional (read: “natural”). Haraway insists that, here and elsewhere, these categories 
conserve the divide between sophisticated and primitive and smuggle racism and 
imperialism in under the guise o f environmentalism.
Noel Sturgeon and Peter van Wyck further this work on cyborgian left- 
environmentalism. Sturgeon, again, a former student of Haraway’s, advocates “cyborg 
ecofeminism,” and van Wyck, a Canadian academic, uses the cyborg in what he terms 
“weak ecology.” Neither author is as well known as Haraway, but each works within the 
same disciplinary lineage and helps explore the potential o f Haraway’s work.
Sturgeon’s Ecofeminist Natures examines the schismatic and controversial history of 
ecofeminism from the perspective o f a practitioner and a critic. She concentrates on three
Z im m er (1990).
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problems in ecofeminist theory: the debate about essentializing women, the separation of 
theory and practice, and division within the movement.
The debate about essentialism centers around the advantages and disadvantages o f 
arguing that women are closer to nature than men (and that women, therefore, are 
“natural” environmentalists). Sturgeon agrees with many theorists that essentialist strains 
o f  ecofeminism simply reverse the valuation of two poles o f an old, patriarchal dualism 
(that women are essentially natural and men cultural), but “natural” is now seen as better 
than “cultural.” At the same time. Sturgeon warns feminist theorists against making 
blanket condemnations o f essentialism. Some essentialisms feed into hegemonic power 
structures, she writes, but others (or the same ones at particular moments) can be 
liberatory. Sturgeon insists that any critique o f essentialism be based on the particular 
implications o f particular essentialisms, not on the fact o f essentialism alone.
Ecofeminism is not monolithic; it might even, Sturgeon suggests, find a useful tool in 
“strategic essentialism,” the intentional use o f certain essentialist arguments at certain 
times for feminist ends.
Citing advice given to her to keep ecofeminist activities off her curriculum vitae lest 
people think she was not a serious academic. Sturgeon continues by lamenting the 
perceived need for feminist academics to remain aloof from ecofeminism. This sort of 
snobbery further separates the ivory tower from popular movements, she argues, and 
promotes a theory/practice divide. It also reflects the stifling, academic tendency to 
typologize. The question of who’s “in” and w ho’s “out” with respect to different sorts of 
feminism and environmentalism can be instructive, but Sturgeon feels that theorists spend 
far too much time generating ways to divide movements (for instance, essential!sm/non-
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essentialism) and not enough finding ways to unite them. Her answer to all these 
concerns— to employ strategic essentialism, bridge the theory-practice divide, and 
encourage a balance between internal critique and solidarity— is clear from the 
beginning.
Interestingly, Sturgeon repackages this agenda in the last few pages of her book under 
the name “cyborg ecofeminism,” because, she asserts, Haraway’s cyborg trope lends 
itself to strategic essentialism, practical theory, and flexible coalitions. Inhabiting 
continually shifting boundaries and not easily set in its ways, the cyborg keeps a critical 
eye on the sort of boundary maintenance that keeps essentialist and antiessentialist (or 
any other strains o f feminist environmentalism) apart. The cyborg also sees nature as a 
genuine actor in the very real work of boundary maintenance. The idea that “natural” 
entities play a role in the social construction of nature makes them count in the equation 
but does not mean that the ecosphere is a “merely violated” guiding spirit. Cyborg 
ecofeminism, accordingly, should highlight the shared conditions and potential coalitions 
o f  women and nature but should not necessarily look to nature for a transcendental 
validation o f feminism.
Sturgeon acknowledges throughout her book the distance that Haraway maintains 
from ecofeminism and its debates, but she suggests that Haraway’s work effectively 
represents a new type of ecofeminism. When she “playfully” names it cyborg 
ecofeminism. Sturgeon insists that she is not trying to invent a new school o f thought 
(and more divisions within the movement) but only to suggest possibilities for a more 
inclusive and flexible feminist environmentalism. Cyborg ecofeminism should work in 
terms o f articulation of and flow over boundaries, not in terms of inclusion and exclusion.
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Sturgeon’s renaming is not meant to signify a
. . .new  and more perfect ecofeminism, but rather to recognize as necessary the dance o f  
critique and consolidation that is part o f  theorizing and political action; the dialectic o f  
creating, deconstructing, and reforming political identities, new alliances, complex analyses, 
and creative oppositional strategies. Every theory aimed towards political change contains 
historically contingent arguments; each solution to political and theoretical problems will be 
historically transient. (195)
As Sturgeon surely realizes, this argument, like Haraway’s in the “Manifesto,” is relevant 
to more than just feminism. In most movements, the dance o f consolidation and critique 
is not given its fair due. The cyborg has the capacity to remind any political group that a 
unified purpose is important but that an effective movement allows for as much 
difference as possible, to keep allies rather than turn them away. However, there is one 
point at which consolidation just seems too scary for Sturgeon. Reading the book with 
the question of this paper in mind, it becomes obvious that although she quotes the 
ecofeminist work o f some men (Jim Cheney, for instance), Sturgeon, like Haraway, stops 
short of advocating alliances with privileged men.
Where Sturgeon avoids the question o f cyborgism and men, Peter van Wyck barrels 
right through it, with nary a look askance.'^ Van W yck’s Primitives in the Wilderness 
happens to go over the exact terrain I had originally intended to cover in this paper. It 
moves from an examination o f conservatism within biocentrist environmental movements 
to a suggestion that we use Haraway’s cyborg figure as a role model for a more partial, 
more leftist, and less fundamentalist environmentalism. Having stumbled across a book 
that already attempts this argument, 1 see a new question; Is biocentrism really the only 
urgent problem with environmentalism? 1 think one could argue that privilege, not
As does Michael Z im m erm an in his Contesting Earth’s Future pp .355-367. However, Zimmerman only 
engages Haraway as one o f  a number o f  “ postmodern” environmental philosophers that he finds interesting.
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biocentrist theory, is at the root o f environmentalism-gone-awry. While biocentrism is 
especially well equipped to disguise the political as scientific or natural, the practicioner 
may deserve more interrogation than the practice. Privilege can corrupt any form of 
environmentalism, biocentrist or not, and any form of environmentalism, in the right 
hands, can do good work. What the cyborg has to say about this is a timely question left 
out, I fear, by van Wyck.
Primitives in the Wilderness begins with a detailed critique of the paradigmatically 
biocentrist environmentalism known as “deep ecology.” Deep ecology falls short, van 
Wyck argues, because it avoids critiquing modernity from the inside, as a part o f it, and 
instead prefers to associate itself with nature, a realm which it locates outside of 
modernity. The result is a critique of modernity that takes on a transcendent air and ends 
up seeming extremely, well, modern. As van Wyck writes, “By developing only a 
superficial and ultimately reactionary analysis o f the ‘modern,’ deep ecology remains 
deeply entwined within the very historical forces it attempts to contest” (2).
Ostensibly, deep ecology stands for the abolition o f modern dualisms like the 
nature/culture divide, but, like some ecofeminisms, it ends up working only to reverse the 
valuation of the terms. “These acts of boundary jumping never really challenge the 
boundaries, only our position in relation to them. The boundaries remain intact, but a 
prohibition is imposed against the side that once held an unnatural sway over the other 
(106).” Deep ecology preserves the nature/culture dualism and strays from mainstream 
modern attitudes only in that it treats culture as a resource for nature, rather than the other
He ends up making no strong claims about whether or not his fellows in the field o f  Environmental Ethics 
should p ick up on her work.
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way around. Ironically, by taking on the role o f nature’s spokesperson, deep ecologists 
seem to position themselves as the sole beneficiaries o f culture-as-resource. Such a 
project, in van W yck’s mind, is reactionary, not revolutionary. This maneuver, he points 
out, is not one o f immersed partiality— the kind that biocentrism claims to exemplify—  
but a quintessential “move to the outside.” With its ubiquitous picture o f Earth from 
space, deep ecology’s purportedly partial subject looks down on everything to proclaim 
that certain acts are natural and good (coyotes eating rabbits) and certain acts are 
unnatural and bad (humans eating coyotes). This move to the outside is even more 
stunning when we consider that deep ecologists claim to speak on behalf of blue marble 
Earth. Transcendence and fundamentalism authorize too many ugly things to be left 
unchecked and unquestioned in the hands of the privileged.
As an example o f the sort o f dangers inherent in deep ecological practice, van Wyck 
discusses deep ecology’s well-known reverence for hunter-gatherer societies. These 
societies, for the deep ecologist, represent a lost golden age and a model for the future.
The deep ecological response to the twentieth-century ecological condition is to wish away the 
hannful effects o f  the “m odem ” by imagining a story wherein modern humans have strayed 
from their pristine and ecologically benign roots. (2)
Deep ecology’s story about primitives posits a fundamental opposition between
contemporary humans who inhabit the culture side o f the nature/culture dualism and the
fantasized premodern or posthistorical subject who inhabits the nature side. Both sides o f
the opposition are homogenized, and the gap between them is neatly swept clean. The
modern human is considered sick and the ecological subject is considered one with the
planet. To erase difference in this way is no small sin in the eyes of van Wyck. The most
dangerous consequence of such erasure is that those moderns labeled primitive and those
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modems who strive to attain primitive status lose political subjectivity. “No longer a 
potential site of resistance, the ecological subject is undifferentiated from its context.
This subject is no subject at all; it becomes a desubjectified organ o f Nature” (106). This 
disguises hegemony, and thus makes deep ecology, at least as received in the United 
States,'^ into a very convenient and comfortable cause for privileged male 
environmentalists. In the deep ecological view, political struggle between groups of 
humans along race, class, or gender lines becomes irrelevant. Those who already exist in 
harmony with nature have no political problems of their own, and those of us who are not 
in harmony with nature need, first and foremost, to worry about the ecosystem. Once we 
are back in touch with Nature, a uniform, biotic matrix will subsume our political 
differences and problems.
Ultimately, van Wyck turns to Haraway and her cyborg for alternatives to these sorts 
o f narratives. His reading of Haraway focuses on cyborg epistemology, and he identifies 
in it a “weak ontology” from which we might derive a “weak ecology.” He sees 
pragmatism in Haraway’s straddling o f deconstruction/ science and other divides and in 
her notion o f political, situated knowledge.
We have both  radical constructionism on the level o f  knowledge claims, a nd  a kind o f  
scientific realism. There is no particular transcendence involved here; just the 
acknowledgm ent that boundaries and meanings are constructs, and their fabrication speaks 
m ore to forms o f  human agency than it does to ontological certainty; this I would call a form o f  
weak ontology. (115)
This weakening o f  thought avoids fundamentalism on one side and political or moral 
paralysis on the other. Weakening our thought actually strengthens our politics, because 
it highlights our implication in the process o f meaning-making and calls attention to our
19 Van W yck makes a point to distinguish the less authoritarian Arne Naess from American deep ecologists
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highly differential and politicized existence. Cyborg politics (like weak ecology) is a 
situated practice. “Its transgressive character is retained only in relation to the boundaries 
it challenges. It does not dream of a metalanguage.. a position of strength, a position 
above and beyond” (133). In answer to Sturgeon’s fear about academics and politics, 
theory and practice collapse because both occur in the same situated, partial space, 
somewhere between the rarefied zone of philosophy and the more tangible experience of 
“real” worlds.
A cyborg’s weak ontology, van Wyck continues, would never generate or even dream 
o f generating an ecology of depth (deep ecology). At the same time, it would not 
foreclose on the possibility o f confronting the global environmental crisis. “Rather it 
[allows] the problem to be thought in all its terrifying complexity” (112). The 
environmental crisis does not admit o f easy answers, only o f consequences that may hurt 
and boundaries that can be disputed. The cyborg gives up on simplistically speaking for 
the trees (135), looking for salvation in nature (113), and dismissing cultural politics as 
unnatural (106)... all projects that van Wyck finds especially problematic in deep 
ecology and, ultimately unnecessary for a strong political movement.
Although van Wyck does not get into it, 1 believe his idea of cyborg 
environmentalism avoids the traps o f some other ecological theories of situated 
knowledge. There is a body of bioregional literature, for example, that agrees with 
Haraway that we have nonhuman partners in the construction of social reality but that 
goes from there to infer a sort o f moral, environmental im p e ra tiv e .T h e  argument reads
like Bill Devait and George Sessions (37). 
See, for instance, Cheney (1989).
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that when we have situated knowledges, we find that our situation begins to demand 
care— and thus, an environmental ethic— from us. The whole notion of moral 
imperatives makes me (and Haraway, I think) nervous, but I also take issue with 
bioregionalists’ treatment o f the “natural” (to the exclusion o f the cultural or political) as 
the only important aspect of situatedness. The argument that situated knowledges 
demand an environmental ethic presumes that it is only animals and watersheds that 
might demand care from us. What about refrigerators, political campaigns, and cracked 
city sidewalks? A ren’t they part o f our surroundings, too?
The cyborg can have a morality based on situatedness, but there is no limit to what its 
situation might be, or to what sort o f morality might spring from that situation. The 
closest Haraway ever gets to espousing bioregionalism is saying that her cyborgian 
epistemology “makes room for surprises and ironies at the heart o f knowledge 
production,” and that this “ is not comfortable for humanists and others committed to the 
world as a resource” (SK 199). Cyborgian epistemology does not necessarily defy or 
support pillagers o f the ecosphere; Haraway and van Wyck agree that there are no 
guarantees here. Cyborg consciousness merely allows for contestation; in van Wyck’s 
words, “The cyborg is a wager” (115).
Although he has quite a bit in common with Haraway, van Wyck differs from her in 
that he places so much o f the blame on biocentrism. The temptation to place the blame 
there is great, especially for a critical mind immersed in a heavily biocentrist 
environmentalist scene like today’s. We should remember, though, that hegemony 
underlies the problems of particular worldviews like biocentrism. Bringing privilege to 
the foreground o f  our critiques of worldviews makes a difference in the conclusions we
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come to. On the last page o f his book, van Wyck alludes to this; “We might also ask if, 
in the end, it is a luxury of the strong to even imagine a strategy of weakness. This seems 
like an important question, but the answer to this will have to remain open” (135). He 
leaves it at that, as if  dispensing with a concern raised by one o f his editors.
It is an important question, though, especially when one realizes that van W yck’s 
cyborg environmentalist is unmarked in terms of race, class, gender, sexuality, etc.— 
giving me the uneasy feeling that his cyborg is none other than our old friend, the 
unremarkably white, middle to upper class, heterosexual male. Van Wyck ends his book 
exactly where it began: with a question about how to deal with the problem of privilege 
in left-environmentalism. In a way, the weak ecologist sounds a lot like Haraway’s 
“sensitive male,” and we have already seen what Haraway thinks about him. Cyborg 
strategy is a wager, for sure, but van Wyck should be more conscious of the sorts o f 
inertia that might make his cyborg environmentalist just another “chip off the old block” 
o f white male hegemony.^'
Beyond Innocence and Guilt?
This paper set out to see if Haraway’s cyborg trope could help white, middle to upper 
class, heterosexual, male left-environmentalists avoid replicating hegemony through their 
activism and theory. The short answer, I believe, is not necessarily. Haraway makes it 
very clear that her cyborg is not about guarantees. The cyborg is only a metaphor for 
what type of subjects we have always been, what type of subjects we have become, and
1 take the phrase from White Guvs. Fred Pfeil’s study o f  changing forms o f  white straight masculinity in 
music, film, and m en ’s movements (1995).
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what type o f subjects we might become. It is meant to show those who would resist 
patriarchy that they already have the tools for hacking into systems of meaning and that 
they need not rely on those narratives o f alienation and salvation (Marxism, Christianity, 
psychoanalysis, etc.) that have let them down many times before. The cyborg is not a 
savior, but it does open political space and opportunity.
Consider the space that has been created for leftism and environmentalism in general. 
To begin with, the cyborg can help leftists see that boundaries are movable and 
contestable. With this understanding, Haraway believes, leftists can more effectively 
tinker with the dualisms (male/female, civilized/primitive, etc.) that have traditionally 
founded race, gender, class, and sexuality-based hierarchies. Cyborg leftists can also 
trouble the boundaries o f kinship typologies used for dividing people and movements 
along philosophical or any other lines. The cyborg frees leftists o f the search for a 
mythical past and the identity o f being innocent and merely violated and thus allows the 
movement to deal with the complexities o f its situatedness. Finally, cyborg leftism 
allows for ironic, shifting coalitions. As embodied, artifactual entities, as tricksters, 
cyborg leftists can take very seriously the moral and political agendas closest to their 
hearts while keeping open minds about most everything else. Marxists need not eschew 
alliance with postmodernists, nor Catholics with pagans, nor New Agers with 
cyberfeminists, to mention only a few examples o f real or potential friction (and alliance) 
within the left.
Cyborg environmentalism holds similar potential. It occupies the divide between 
natural and artificial, suggests that we are all cyborgs, and maintains that the distinction 
between biological and technological or cultural systems is fuzzy at best. This radically
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challenges environmentalisms founded on a stable image of nature. Nature becomes 
elusive and negotiable; we can’t find it (or its essence) just by sitting in one place long 
enough and observing, and its meaning is not completely relative and “up for grabs.” 
Denied the possibility o f a morally, metaphysically, or politically simple 
environmentalism, cyborg environmentalists could be more likely to notice when their 
rhetoric or actions work to conserve hegemonic structures or when their politics are being 
erased in the name o f a notion o f “ecological integrity” drawn too rigidly, too much 
supported for its own sake.
The authors I have discussed leave one hole in their work: the question of white, 
middle to upper class, heterosexual, left-environmentalist male cyborgs. This pattern is 
understandable. My character, in a sense, already speaks fluent cyborg. Born a warlord 
o f systems o f meaning, trained as border guard for dualisms and kinship-designations, 
and indoctrinated as a giver and taker of power, he already occupies the shifting terrain o f 
cyborg consciousness. His most sacred task, arguably, is to secure complete power 
through exclusive access to cyborg consciousness. Disenfranchised people who might 
clearly see the contestability o f borders and hierarchies are continually policed, lest they 
step out o f line or do irreparable damage to the operating system. So does this mean that 
the inertia o f privilege will necessarily make my character a “bad” cyborg, even if he tries 
to be a “good” one? Perhaps, but to quote Haraway slightly out o f context, “that doesn’t 
mean we have to give away the game, cash in our chips and go home.” The places where 
cyborgism might fail us, she argues, are exactly, “the places where we need to keep 
contesting” (Int 8).
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Haraway closes her “Manifesto” with a useful image from her background as a 
biologist. Reiterating that cyborgs are outside o f the sort o f alienation-salvation 
narratives that call for born again souls and societies, Haraway stresses that the cyborg is 
more comfortable with regeneration than with rebirth. It mutates in a context, never born 
o f  nowhere or by discrete parents. In this respect, the cyborg reminds Haraway of 
salamanders.
For salamanders, regeneration after injury, such as the loss of a limb, involves regrowth of structure 
and restoration o f  function with the constant possibility o f  twinning or other odd topographical 
productions at the site o f  former injury. The regrown limb can be monstrous, duplicated, potent.
We have all been injured, profoundly. We require regeneration, not rebirth, and the possibilities for 
our constitution include the utopian dream o f  the hope for a monstrous world without gender. (181)
Although stylistically awkward, it is telling that she calls a world without gender a 
“possibility” o f a “dream” of a “hope.” Her syntax indicates that she sees the possibility 
as distant. Gender still matters here and now. My character cannot escape his maleness, 
but he can develop odd topographical growths, like “pro-feminism” or “anti-racist 
environmentalism.” Haraway puts her hope in the power of monsters (cyborg or 
salamander), in the way the system screws up and burps out a potent remainder. What 
this means for the leftist, environmentalist, white man, I think, is that the cyborg can open 
up a space for resistance beyond innocence and guilt.^^
We know that the assumption of innocence is problematic. I remember, for instance, 
the account of a male rape survivor whose rapist, between bouts of punching and 
penetration, would sometimes stop to comfort his victim, tearfully proclaiming that they 
were both horribly wounded by society. What the rapist said was most likely true— the
-- Thanks to Annabel Bradford for help with this idea.
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victim  was intimately wounded, and the rapist had likely not had an ideal life— but 
woundedness does not justify atrocity.
While acknowledging a tyrannical history can be important, the assumption o f guilt 
can be problematic for the privileged leftist. A certain type of guilty feeling, for example, 
can make white guys afraid to identify as feminists or to work on minority issues or in 
minority communities. The fear o f their own sexist and racist attitudes (or worse, the fear 
o f  having them pointed out by the other) can paralyze these potential resistors. Guilt here 
acts like the Wilderness Retreat, as a segregatory mechanism that postpones radical 
change. This aspect o f guilt is counter-productive. While white guys should not forget 
that the deck is stacked in their favor, they do not need to accept the deck at face value; as 
its illegitimate cyborg children, they can reject the system of domination and subvert its 
prejudiced allocation of extra “points.”
Furthermore, white guilt, heterosexual guilt, male guilt, class guilt, and Western guilt 
can actually all preserve elements o f hegemony. This family of guilt assumes (and 
enforces through daily interactions) that the other has been reduced to something 
irreparably and shamefully wounded and that the self alone carries the difficult 
responsibility o f magnanimously welcoming the other in(to the unmarked white society 
o f the self). Guiltily avoiding the eye o f an African American on the street, for example, 
carries with it the assumption that the African American has been made socially and 
culturally inferior (by the system) and communicates that s/he is an untouchable outsider 
unable to regenerate autonomously.
The cyborg bears good news here. White, middle to upper class, heterosexual, male 
left-environmentalists can move beyond the airy spaces o f innocence and guilt to inhabit
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the lively, real, material-semiotic spaces o f boundary work and embodied discursiveness. 
As cyborgs allied with the disempowered, they can do an “inside-job” on a system that 
continually violates and subjugates people, plants, and animals alike. Embracing 
cyborgism may also help left-enviromuentalist men take their identity less seriously, 
avoid feeling purely evil or hegemonic, and resist the often insecure need to take extra 
points for being sensitive, environmentalist, or leftist. White guys can and should 
participate, albeit cautiously, in the very conversations that indict them. This is a hard 
lesson to learn, and when it is easy, we should ask why. This means surrendering the 
comfort of acting as a talking head for environmentalism and leftism; it means taking an 
implicated stance somewhere down with the “rabble”; and it means always running the 
risk o f disconnecting the wrong wires. The cyborg will not necessarily solve all our 
problems, but good things don’t often come with guarantees.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
47
W orks Cited
Balsamo, Anne. Technologies o f the Gendered Body: Reading Cvborg W omen.
Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1996.
Brown University Staff. Coming to Terms: Feminism -  Theory -  Politics. New York: 
Routledge, 1989.
Bullard, Robert D., ed. Contesting Environmental Racism: Voices from the Grassroots. 
Boston: South End Press, 1993.
Cheney, Jim. "Postmodern Environmental Ethics: Ethics as Bioregional Narrative." In 
Environmental Ethics 11 (1989): 117-34
Dunlap, Riley, and Mertig, Angela, eds. American Environmentalism: The U.S. 
Movement 1970-1990. New York: Taylor and Francis, 1992.
Ellis, Jeffrey. “On the Search for a Root Cause: Essentialist Tendencies in Environmental 
Discourse.” in Cronon, William, ed. Uncommon Ground. New York:
Norton, 1996. pp.256-268.
Gray, Chris Hables, Mentor, Steven, and Figueroa-Sarriera, Fleidi. “Cyborgology: 
Constructing the Knowledge of Cybernetic Organisms.” In Gray, Chris 
Fiables, ed. The Cvborg Handbook. New York: Routledge, 1995. pp.1-14.
Gray, Chris Fiables, ed. The Cvborg Handbook. New York: Routledge, 1995
Guha, Ramachandra. “Radical American Environmentalism and Wilderness
Preservation: A Third World Critique.” In Environmental Ethics 11 (1989): 
71-83.
Haraway, Donna. “Cyborgs at Large: Interview with Donna Haraway.” With Andrew 
Ross and Constance Penley in Ross, Andrew and Penley, Constance, eds. 
Technoculture. University o f Minnesota Press, 1991. pp .1-20
 -   . “Introduction” in Simians, Cvborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of
Nature. New York: Routledge, 1991. ppl-4.
 . “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the
Late Twentieth Century.” In Simians. Cvborgs, and Women: The 
Reinvention o f Nature. New York: Routledge, 1991. ppl49-182.
 . "A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the
Late 1980’s.” In Socialist Review  80 (1985): 65-108.
 — ..........— . “Situated Knowledges.” In Simians. Cyborgs, and Women: The
Reinvention o f Nature. New York: Routledge, 1991. ppl 83-202.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
48
-------------- - Modest Witness@.Second_Milleniiim.FenialeMan© meets OncoMouse™.
New York: Routledge, 1997.
................... . “The Promise o f Monsters: A Regenerative Politics for Inappropriate/d” in
Grossberg. et al., ed. Cultural Studies. New York: Routledge, 1992.
hooks, bell. Talking Back: Thinking Black. Thinking Feminist. Boston; South End, 
1989.
 ............. “Eating the Other: Desire and Resistance” . In Black Looks: Race and
Representation Boston: South End, 1992.
Kunzm, Hari. “You Are Borg: For Donna Haraway, We Are Already Assimilated.” In 
WIRED 5.02 US(19xx).
Lease, Gary, and Soule, Michael. Reinventing Nature?: Responses to Postmodern 
Deconstruction. Washington, B.C.: Island Press, 1995.
Luke, Timothy. Ecocritigue: Contesting the Politics o f Nature, Economy, and Culture. 
Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press, 1997.
Parini, Jay. “The Greening of the Humanities: Deconstruction is Compost.
Environmental Studies is the Academic Field of the 90's” . New York Times 
Magazine. (October 29, 1995). pp. 52-53.
Pfeil, Fred. White Guvs: Studies in Postmodern Domination and Difference. New 
York: Verso, 1995.
Putnam, Hilary. Renewing Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.
Ross, Andrew. The Chicago Gangster Theory of Life. New York: Verso, 1994.
Sandoval, Chela. “New Sciences: Cyborg Feminism and the Methodology of the 
Oppressed.” In Gray, Chris Hables, ed. (1995).
Seager, Joni. Earth Follies: Coming to Feminist Terms with the Global Environment^  
Crisis. New York: Routledge, 1993.
Sturgeon, Noel. Ecofeminist natures: Race, Gender, Feminist Theory, and Political 
Action. N ew York: Routledge, 1997.
Zimmer, Carl. “Tech in the jungle; in the Amazon, Indians have decided that the
Camcorder is Mightier than the War Club." In DzTcovcr (August 1990) v l 1 
n8 p42-45
Zimmerman, Michael. Contesting Earth’s Future: Radical Ecology and Postmpdernity. 
California, 1997.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
